Specific Performance under Venezuelan Law by Galvis, Sergio J.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 16 | Issue 3
1984
Specific Performance under Venezuelan Law
Sergio J. Galvis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western
Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sergio J. Galvis, Specific Performance under Venezuelan Law, 16 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 437 (1984)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol16/iss3/4
COMMENT
Specific Performance Under Venezuelan Law
by Sergio J. Galvis*
I. INTRODUCTION
T his article examines the role of specific performance as a contrac-
tual remedy under Venezuelan law. It does not undertake a compre-
hensive comparison of the theory and practice of common law and civil
law in this area. Nevertheless, the study makes frequent reference to
common law concepts in order to define the terminology and to assist
lawyers whose research and practice exposes them to both systems.
The first part of the article examines the theoretical role of specific
performance under each system. It suggests that specific performance,
though treated as an extraordinary remedy by the common law, is viewed
as the usual and natural remedy under the civil law. The article then
discusses the general treatment of obligations under Venezuelan law. It
explores Venezuelan doctrinal and jurisprudential concepts about the for-
mation and reasons for enforcement of contractual obligations. The dis-
cussion focuses on those general principles of contractual obligations
which operate to limit the application of specific performance in
Venezuela.
The article next explains that contractual obligations can be per-
formed either in specie (specific performance) or in equivalent (money
damages), voluntarily or involuntarily (pursuant to a court order), and
directly (by the promisor) or indirectly (by the promisee or by a third
party). These methods of performance give rise to three types of contrac-
tual remedies: (1) specific performance; (2) indirect specific performance;
* Judicial Clerk to Hon. Lawrence W. Pierce, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit; J.D., Harvard Law School (1983); B.A., College of William & Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia (1980).
The author wishes to thank Eugenio Herindez-Bret6n for his assistance in completing
this article.
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and, (3) money damages. The discussion focuses on the practical circum-
stances under which Venezuelan courts generally grant these remedies.
The article then examines various mechanisms that might be availa-
ble under Venezuelan law to enforce these remedies. The inadequacy of
these mechanisms seriously undermines the application of specific per-
formance, limiting its role to the enforcement of simple obligations to
give and to deliver. Finally, the article proposes various alternatives that
a party might pursue to assure that he will secure in Venezuela the pre-
ferred remedy of specific performance.
II. DIscusSION
A. Specific Performance Under Common and Civil Law
The common law and the civil law differ fundamentally in their
treatment of specific performance as a contractual remedy.1 In common
law jurisdictions, a promisor's primary obligation to perform is trans-
formed upon breach of contract into a secondary duty to compensate
through money damages.2 Courts of equity in common law systems only
grant specific performance where money damages are inadequate and
other prerequisites are met.$ Thus, specific performance becomes an ex-
traordinary, equitable remedy which courts in common law systems rarely
will impose.4 Once it issues its order of specific performance, however, the
common law court will enforce it against the defendant's person as well as
property. To enforce his judgment, the judge is empowered to order coer-
cive measures including, if necessary, the defendant's arrest.5
Under Venezuelan and other civil law systems, a promisor's primary
obligation to perform is not affected by his breach of contract.0 His non-
performance does not transform his duty to perform into a secondary ob-
ligation to pay money damages. Rather, the promisor remains obligated
to comply with the precise terms of the contract. Moreover, in some civil
' See generally Szladits, The Concept of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 Am. J.
Comp. L. 208, 231 (1955).
I A. Coams, LAw OF CONTRACT 506 (1930).
Specific performance is also precluded in the common law where (1) continuous su-
pervision would be required to obtain the necessary performance; (2) the contract involves
the continuance of a personal relationship; (3) the defendant after obeying the order would
be entitled to nullify his performance; (4) the defendant's performance is conditioned upon
performance by the plaintiff; (5) the performance was impossible at the time the contract
came into existance; (6) the performance required has not been specified with certainty;,
and, (7) the granting of specific performance would place undue hardship on the defendant.
See Szladits, supra note 1, at 210-11.
McCallister v. Patton, 214 Ark. 293, 215 S.W.2d 701 (1948).
5 Szladits, supra note 1, at 211.
E. MAnuRo LuYANDo, CURSO DE OBLIGACIoNEs: DxRECHO CIV HI, at 82 (1967).
Vol. 16:437
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
law jurisdictions, though certainly not in all,7 the promisee is precluded
from demanding money damages unless he demonstrates that specific
performance is no longer possible." Thus, civil law jurisdictions, unlike
common law jurisdictions, consider specific performance the usual and
natural remedy for breach of contract.9
B. Contractual Obligations Under Venezuelan Law
The Venezuelan Civil Code defines a contract as an agreement be-
tween two or more parties to institute, regulate, transfer, modify or extin-
guish a legal obligation. 10 These agreements embody the free will of the
parties and, hence, carry the force of law between the them.1' For this
reason, Venezuelan jurisprudence and doctrine,1 2 as well as the Civil
Code,13 deem it essential that the parties perform, and if necessary the
courts enforce, contractual obligations exactly as contracted. 4 In theory,
therefore, all contractual obligations are to be enforced in specie. 15
This general view is limited by two principles of Venezuelan law that
underlie the performance of all civil obligations. First, Venezuelan law
provides that all contractual obligations are patrimonial in nature. 6
7 Venezuela is one of these jurisdictions. Id. (citing CODIGO CIVIL DE LA REPUBLICA DE
VENEZUELA [CIv. CODE] arts. 1264, 1290 and 1291 (1982)). So is France. See Szladits, supra
note 1, at 233.
8 Argentina, Germany and Switzerland fall within this category. See E. MADURo
LUyANDo, supra note 6, at 83; Szladits, supra note 1, at 233.
9 See Szladits, supra note 1, at 233 (citing Stewart v. Kennedy, 15 App. Cas. 75, 102
(1890)).
'0 CIV. CODE art. 1133.
12 Id. at art. 1159.
11 Judgment of July 27, 1955, Corte de Casaci6n, Caracas, Gaceta Forense (2S) IX 545.
The term jurisprudence is used in Venezuela to refer to case law. Doctrine refers to the
commentaries of domestic and foreign authors.
'" CIV. CODE art. 1264.
" Under the Venezuelan Civil Code, el buen padre de familia is equivalent to the rea-
sonable man standard used under the common law to evaluate the promisor's behavior. Civ.
CODE art. 1270.
I' The theoretical preference for specific performance thus seems to be based on the
triumph of moral considerations (i.e., parties must fulfill their promises) over economic
ones. In theory, at least, specific performance is the proper remedy under Venezuelan law,
regardless of economic considerations. This approach removes the option generally available
to a promisor in common law systems of breaching a contract and then paying the resulting
money damages, if it is economically feasible to do so. The moral tone of contract law in
civil law systems results, in part, from the greater role played by Roman and cannon law in
its development. In contrast, the common law approach to contracts developed, in large
part, through the practical application of general principles to particular cases. See gener-
ally A. VoN MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE Civm LAW SYsTEM 15-18 (2d ed. 1977) (comparing
the early history of contract law in Continental Europe and England).
16 E. MDuRo LuYANDo, supra note 6, at 31 (citing Civ. CODE arts. 1863, 1864 and
1984
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Thus, by virtue of the contract which creates an obligation between the
promisor and the promisee, the promisee acquires certain rights over the
promisor's property. In the case of nonperformance, the promisee can
seek satisfaction of the outstanding obligation by acting against the
promisor's property. Second, Venezuelan doctrine accepts the legal
maxim, nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum, 17 which provides that the
law cannot compel a promisor, manu militari, to undertake a physical act
in performance of a contractual obligation."' The upshot is that a Vene-
zuelan court seeking to enforce a civil judgment will be able to act against
the promisor's property, but not his person.19
1. Classification of Obligations
Venezuela, like other civil law systems, classifies contractual obliga-
tions into the following categories: (1) obligations to give (obligaciones de
dar); (2) obligations to do (obligaciones de hacer); and, (3) obligations to
abstain (obligaciones de no hacer). Most contracts contain a mixture of
these obligations. For example, a contract for the sale of personal prop-
erty ordinarily involves an obligation to give as well as a consequential
obligation to conserve, which itself combines obligations to do and to ab-
stain, and an obligation to deliver.20
a. Obligations to Give
Where the parties agree to transfer ownership or another right in
rem21 from the promisor to the promisee, the contractual obligation is
called an obligation to give.22 The pure obligation to give is satisfied when
the promisor gives his express consent to transfer the title of the property
stipulated in the contract. 23 The promisor performs his duty at an ab-
stract level without having to undertake any physical acts.24 In practice,
1929); see also A. COLIN & H. CAPITANT, CURSO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CivnL 71 (1960).
17 "No one can be compelled to give specific performance of an undertaking to perform
some act." See generally Szladits, supra note 1, at 215 (citing R. POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE
CONRACT OF LETTING Aim HIRING (contrat de louage) 27, 88 (1953)).
,8 See supra note 12.
19 E. MADURo LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 31.
20 CIV. CODE art. 1265; see also A. COLIN & H. CAPrrANT, supra note 16, at 23.
For example, an easement, usufruct or mortgage. See A. COLIN & H. CAPITANT, supra
note 16, at 20.
" E. MADuRo LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 60.
23 See CIv. CODE art. 1161; see also 3 M. ARCAYA, CODIGO CIvM 31-32 (1968) (citing
Judgment of Mar. 17, 1961, Juzgado Segundo de Primera Instancia en lo Civil Mencartil de
la Circunscripci6n Judicial del Estado Zulia).
24 See A. COLIN & H. CAPrFANT, supra note 16, at 20; Crv. CODE art. 1285 (the promisor
can validly consent if he is the owner of the good and has the power of alienation).
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obligations to give usually are accompanied by the consequential obliga-
tions to conserve and to deliver the object specified in the contract. These
consequential duties are classified as obligations to do because their per-
formance usually requires the promisor to undertake some physical
activity.25
Obligations to give may involve either real property (inmuebles) or
personal property (muebles).2s They may also involve either unique,
nonfungible goods (Picasso's Guernika) or fungible goods (a truck). The
goods might be determined (a particular truck) or in genere, non-deter-
mined (10 trucks). Moreover, the property may be in the promisor's pos-
session or in the possession of a third party.27 Whether the contract in-
volves real or personal property, unique, fungible or nonfungible
property, and determined or nondetermined goods in the possession of
the promisor or in the possession of a third party will determine whether
the obligation to give is subject to specific performance.
b. Obligations to Do
Obligations to do are the most common of the three types of contrac-
tual obligations. This category includes all obligations that require the
promisor to undertake an activity other than the transfer of property.
One set of obligations to do involves duties that are directly connected
with obligations to give, for example, where the promisor is committed to
conserving and delivering the object of the contract. 2s Another set of obli-
gations to do includes duties that bind the promisor to undertake an ac-
tivity, perform and act or develop a particular object or behavior.29 These
activities can be of three types. The first type involves acts that are per-
sonal in nature, i.e., intuitu personae obligations. The contractual value
of these obligations to the promisee lies in their being performed person-
ally by the promisor, for example where a famous artist contracts to paint
the promisee's portrait. The value of the obligation to the promisee arises
from the particular artist painting the portrait.30 The second type in-
25 CIv. CoDE art. 1265; see supra note 23. The obligation to conserve also carries ele-
ments of an obligation to abstain.
26 CIV. CODE arts. 525-37. Unlike the common law, Venezuelan civil law does not place
real property in a special category with respect to specific performance. Nevertheless, Vene-
zuelan courts usually grant specific performance with respect to obligations to give real
property.
27 For an excellent discussion of these variations, see G. KummERow, CoMP'ENDIO DE
BiENEs Y DERECHos REALES 44-48 (1980).
28 CIv. CODE art. 1265.
A. COLIN & H. CAPrrANT, supra note 16, at 21.
'o E. MADuRo LuYANDo, supra note 6, at 99. Professor Ruggiero draws a distinction
between those activities having a strictly personal character and those activities not having
that character. The former can be undertaken by the promisor pursuant to his personal
1984
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cludes activities that are not personal in nature, and can thus be per-
formed equally by the promisor, the promisee or a third party. This oc-
curs, for example, where the promisee contracis to have a ditch dug. In
that case, the activity can be performed equally by the promisor or by
any other ditch digger. The third type of activity involves obligations that
are to be performed abstractly and, hence, do not require the promisor to
undertake any physical activity.31 This situation arises, for example,
where the obligation is to enter into a contract. As is the case with obliga-
tions to give, the type of obligation to do determines whether a Venezue-
lan court will grant specific performance.
c. Obligations to Abstain
Obligations that bind the promisor to refrain from undertaking a
particular activity are known as obligations to abstain.3 2 These obliga-
tions are breached the moment the promisor does the act which he had
promised not to do. For example, an obligation to abstain is breached
when the promisor goes into business in violation of a noncompetition
agreement.
Venezuelan civil law distinguishes between obligations to abstain
where the breach leads to consequences that can be reversed, erased or
destroyed, and where the breach creates irreversible consequences.3 De-
struction is possible, for example, where the obligation is to abstain from
building a wall, but it is not possible where the obligation is to refrain
from burning a painting. Obviously, the contractual remedy granted upon
breach of an obligation to abstain depends upon whether the consequence
of the breach can be reversed, erased or destroyed.3 4
C. Performance of Obligations
1. Specific Performance or Money Damages
As stated above, since contracts embody the free will of the parties,
they carry the force of law in Venezuela and are enforceable between the
parties.3 5 Obligations, therefore, are to be performed, and if necessary,
enforced, exactly as contracted.3 6 Consistent with this principle, Venezue-
qualities; the latter can be performed by the promisee or by a third party. See 3 M. ARCAYA,
supra note 23, at 192 (citing R. RUGGIERO, INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL 34-35 (1964)).
31 E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 99. To an extent, therefore, these obligations
are similar to obligations to give.
32 A. COLIN & H. CAPITANr, supra note 16, at 21.
" CIv. CODE art. 1268; E. MADURo LuYANDo, supra note 6, at 100.
m See supra note 33.
35 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
36 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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lan law permits the promisee to retain the right, after a breach of con-
tract, to demand the specific performance of the obligation.
Obligations in Venezuela can be performed either in specie or in
equivalent, voluntarily or involuntarily, and directly or indirectly.3 7 These
various methods of performance give rise to the following types of con-
tractual remedies: (1) specific performance (cumplimiento forzoso en es-
pecie); (2) indirect specific performance (cumplimiento forzoso en especie
indirecto); and, (3) money damages (cumplimiento forzoso en
equivalente).
The Venezuelan Civil Code states that all obligations must be per-
formed exactly as they were contracted.38 The aggrieved promisee, there-
fore, has a right to demand specific performance"9 as long as that remedy
is not legally or physically impossible. 0 If specific performance is not pos-
sible, however, the promisee only can seek compensation for damages
arising from the breach of contract. This compensation, usually in the
form of money, is viewed as a substitute for specific performance 1 and
thus is considered equivalent to money damages.
Venezuelan law does not provide a clear standard for measuring
money damages.2 Both the case law4s and the commentators44 make gen-
eral reference to damages (dafos y perjuicios) but fail to specify how
these are to be determined. Venezuelan law recognizes that money dam-
ages should be sufficient to place the promisee in the position he would
have been in had there been full performance of the contract. 45 This is
similar to the expectancy measure followed in common law jurisdictions. 46
Yet, this general notion is not clarified further and therefore is not very
helpful. Unlike the common law,47 Venezuelan law does not specify the
different measures that might be appropriate to determine what the
37 E. MAwuRo LuYANDo, supra note 6, at 88-89.
18 CIV. CODE art. 1264.
E. MADuO LuYANDO, supra note 6, at 77-78 (citing Cirv. CODE arts. 1264, 1290 and
1291).
40 For a discussion of the circumstances under which specific performance would be
impossible, see infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
41 See A. COLIN & H. CAPrrANT, supra note 16, at 39-40.
42 See generally E. MAuo LuYANDo, supra note 6, at 80. See also A. COLIN & H.
CAPrrANT, supra note 16, at 135-36.
43 See 3 M. ARCAYA, supra note 23, at 190 (citing Judgment of Nov. 10, 1953, Corte de
Casaci6n, Gaceta Forense, No. 2 (2S) 434).
44 E. MADuRo LUYANDo, supra note 6, at 80.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929).
4' In the common law courts, expectancy damages are determined either by the cost of
completion or by the diminished value. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Company, 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1962). See generally A. VON MEHREN & J. GoRDLEY,
supra note 15, at 1110-11.
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promisee's positions would have been had the promisor performed fully.
A principle issue raised by the distinction drawn between perform-
ance in specie and performance in equivalent is whether the aggrieved
party has a choice to request either specific performance or money dam-
ages. Some civil law jurisdictions give an absolute priority to specific per-
formance.48 Under this approach, the promisee is permitted to sue for
specific performance as long as that remedy remains possible. The prom-
isee can only request money damages if he proves that specific perform-
ance is impossible.49 The courts will dismiss the claim for money damages
if specific performance is still available.5 0
Venezuelan civil law follows a system of relative, rather than abso-
lute, priority.51 Performance in specie is given full force during the period
between the birth or rise of the obligation and the time of performance;
during this time, which from a common law perspective is prior to the
breach of contract, the promisee cannot demand, and the promisor can-
not offer, performance of a different obligation.52 Once the time for per-
formance has expired, the promisee is given the option of claiming money
damages in lieu of specific performance.5 3 The same option, however, is
not extended to the promisor. He must perform in specie unless he proves
that to do so would be impossible.
a. Voluntary or Involuntary Performance
This distinction is an obvious one. The promisor is to perform all
contractual obligations spontaneously and voluntarily." Nonperformance
gives the promisee the right to have the obligation enforced through coer-
cive means (cumplimiento forzoso).5 5 The issue then becomes whether
the court will grant specific performance or money damages.
b. Direct or Indirect Performance
Direct performance occurs where the promisor executes the contrac-
tual obligation. This is the usual and expected method of executing obli-
gations under Venezuelan law.5 6 Indirect performance exists where a
party other than the promisor performs the obligation. Some, if not most,
4' These jurisdictions include Argentina, Germany and Switzerland. E. MADURO
LutANDO, supra note 6, at 82; Szladits, supra note 1, at 221-34.
49 Szladits, supra note 1, at 228.
50 Id.
'1 E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 83-86.
52 CIV. CODE art. 1290 and 1291.
53 E. MADURO LUYANDo, supra note 6, at 83.
I" Id. at 86; see Civ. CODE art. 1160.
5 E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 86-87; Civ. CODE art. 1167.
11 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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obligations are subject to both direct and indirect performance, 7 such as
where there is an obligation to give a fungible good possessed by the
promisor. Other obligations are subject to direct, but not to indirect, per-
formance. This would be the case where the promisor has a unique good
or where the obligation involves a personal activity by the promisor."
Under Venezuelan law, the concept of direct performance is distinct
from that of specific -performance.59 For doctrinal purposes, contractual
obligations can be subject to specific performance whether they are per-
formed directly or indirectly. Thus, Venezuelan courts and commentators
draw a distinction between direct specific performance (cumplimiento
forzoso en forma especifica) and indirect specific performance (cum-
plimiento forzoso en especie indirecto). Direct specific performance oc-
curs where the court directs the promisor to perform the obligation him-
self;6 0 indirect specific performance occurs where the court gives the
promisee authority to have the duty performed at the promisor's ex-
pense."' Where neither of these two remedies is available, the promisee
must settle for compensation in the form of money damages.6 2
2. Forced Performance of Contractual Obligations
a. Forced Performance of Obligations to Give
The rules pertaining to the specific performance of obligations to give
are relatively simple. An obligation to give is performed where the prom-
isor gives his express consent to transfer ownership or some other type of
right over the object of the obligation."3 A court decision recognizing such
an obligation also can serve as a substitute for the promisor's consent.
Thus, the obligation to give can be accomplished without having to coerce
the promisor into undertaking a physical act; under these circumstances,
57 But see Civ. CODE art. 1801 (obligations arising from games of chance or other forms
of gambling will not be enforced).
"CIv. CODE art. 1284.
fl E. MADURo LuYANDo, supra note 6, at 88.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 89.
62 Id. at 89-90. Indirect specific performance and money damages are not the same rem-
edy even though their money value may sometimes be the same. The two remedies differ in
at least the following three ways: (1) the money value of each remedy at times will differ
(i.e., the cost of knocking the wall down will differ from the damages suffered as a result of
the wall); (2) the promisee must show actual loss to collect money damages but not to re-
ceive indirect specific performance; and, (3) the execution of indirect performance may in-
volve a greater invasion of the promisor's property interest than might be the case with the
payment of money damages (i.e., entering his property to destroy the wall). Melich-Orsini,
La Ejecuci6n Forzosa en Especie de las Obligaci~ns de Hacer y de no Hacer, in EsTunios
DE DERECHO Ci 65, 128-49 (1st ed. 1975).
63 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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the maximum nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum 4 does not preclude
the issuance of specific performance.
This general statement is applicable regardless of whether that good
is movable or immovable,65 to situations where the obligation to give in-
volves a unique, nonfungible good that is in the promisor's possession."6
This analysis also applies to those situations where the promisor holds a
determined, fungible good that is the object of the obligation. Finally, the
general rule also applies to nondetermined fungible goods where the
promisor holds a sufficient quantity and quality of the good.67
Various obligations to give are not subject to direct specific perform-
ance, but can be indirectly performed in specie, such as where the prom-
isor does not own the property that he is to transfer. The promisor cannot
be compelled to enter the market and purchase the good or right for the
promisee's benefit.68 The promisee, however, can seek judicial authority
to obtain the good from a third party at the promisor's expense.6 In
practice this will usually occur where the object of the obligation is a fun-
gible good, but in theory, indirect specific performance is also applicable
to unique, non-fungible property as long as the promisee can obtain the
property from the third party.70
Some obligations to give cannot be performed in specie, either di-
rectly or indirectly. If the object of the obligation cannot be acquired
from a third party,7 1 then the promisee must settle for money damages.1 2
This occurs if the property involved is a unique, nonfungible good that
has perished or has been destroyed. 3 Money damages also are the only
available remedy where the good, available at the time of the breach, no
longer is obtainable due to shortages or legal prohibition.
Other obligations to give which are not subject to either direct or
indirect specific performance are those that involve in genere goods the
selection and measure of which require the promisor's cooperation. En-
forcement of these obligations in specie becomes impossible since the
64E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 98; Judgment of July 27, 1955, Corte de Case-
ci6n, Caracas, Gaceta Forense (2S) IX 545.
'5Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 179-84; see also 3 L. BoFrn BOGGERO, TRATADO DE
LAS OBLIGACIONES 305 (1973) (citing article 574 of the Argentinian Civil Code which ex-
pressly regulates this situation).
e6 E. MADuRo LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 98. For example, a famous painting.
11 For example, 10 trucks. 2 J. GiORGI, TEORIA DE LAS OBLIGACIONEs 155 (1928).
68 3 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD & J. MAZEAUD, LECCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL 214-15
(1960) [hereinafter cited as 3 MAZEAUD].
69 CIV. CODE art. 1266; see E. MADURO LUyANDo, supra note 6, at 89.
70 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 184 n.113 (citing Commercial Code arts. 142, 181,
295, 339, 397 and 534).
71 E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 93.
72 CIv. CODE art. 1264.
73 2 J. GIORGI, supra note 67, at 158.
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promisor cannot be forced to do these activities. Under those circum-
stances, the promisee must settle for money damages."4
The promisor may request money damages even if specific perform-
ance would be available to him.75 If he does request specific performance,
he also will be able to demand compensation for the direct losses suffered
between the time the contract is breached and the judgment is enforced.7 6
b. Forced Performance of Obligations to Do
The discrepancy found between the rule that all contractual obliga-
tions should be performed exactly as contracted7 7 and the infrequent ap-
plication of specific performance is most evident with respect to obliga-
tions to do. This type of obligation requires that the promisor undertake
a physical activity. Venezuelan law, however, does not permit the use of
force to compel a party to do a physical act78 and, thus, few of these obli-
gations are subject to specific performance.
There are two sets of obligations to do that courts will enforce
through specific performance. The first group involves obligations to con-
serve and to deliver, duties that are consequential to the obligation to
give.79 The second group includes those obligations that the promisor is to
perform abstractly and that therefore do not require the promisor to un-
dertake any physical activity. 0 This is the case, for example, where the
promisor agrees to leave an offer open, but then tries to revoke the offer
before the promisee accepts it.81 A similar situation exists where the obli-
gation is to decree a right or sign a document. A judicial order will serve
as a substitute for the act, thus granting the promisee specific
performance.82
With the exception of the limited cases described above, all obliga-
tions to do must be enforced either by indirect specific performance 8 or
the payment of money damages." In case of nonperformance, courts can
authorize the promisee to perform or to have a third party perform, at
the promisor's expense, the particular contractual obligation. 5 This rule
applies, for example, where the promisor breaches his duty to dig a ditch
74 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 179.
75 See supra note 7.
76 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 132.
7 Civ. CODE art. 1264.
78 See supra notes 17 and 18.
79 CIv. CODE art. 1265.
80 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
8' Civ. CODE art. 1137.
82 Judgment of July 27, 1955, Corte de Casaci6n, Caracas, Gaceta Forense (2S) IX 545.
3 CIV. CODE art. 1266.
" 3 MAzEAUD, supra note 68, at 215-16.
85 Cxv. CODE art. 1266.
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and the promisee seeks authority to have another ditch-digger do the job
at the promisor's expense. Indirect specific performance therefore makes
the promisee whole without violating the prohibition of use of force
against the promisor.8 6
Venezuelan courts may also grant indirect specific performance
where the obligation involves a fungible activity that the promisor or an-
other party can perform equally well. Obligations to do which are not
subject to indirect specific performance, however, require the promisee to
settle for money damages. This will occur, for example, if the obligations
involve acts that are personal in nature. The contractual value of these
intuitu personae obligations is in the performance by the promisor. Since
the courts cannot force the promisor to undertake these activifies, and
since performance by a third party would not satisfy the promisee, the
promisee's only remedy is money damages . 7 Other obligations to do that
only can be remedied by the payment of money damages arise where the
promisor is to perform an activity within a certain time period that al-
ready has expired.8
The promisee may request money damages even if specific perform-
ance is available to him in a particular case."9 If he prefers money dam-
ages and the remedy is available, he also can demand compensation for
the direct losses suffered between the time of breach and the enforcement
of the judgment.9 0
c. Forced Performance of Obligations to Abstain
The rules regarding the specific performance of obligations to abstain
are similar to those pertaining to obligations to do. The prohibition
against the use of physical force to coerce an individual to undertake or
cease from doing an activity pursuant to a contractual obligation once
again serves to severely limit the general preference for specific
performance.9 1
The common law concept of the injunction does not exist in Vene-
zuelan civil law.9 2 Thus, Venezuelan courts cannot compel parties to act
in connection with the enforcement of civil obligations. Moreover, obli-
gees cannot seek judicial enforcement of obligations prior to a promisor's
breach.93 That is, Venezuelan law does not recognize the common law
6 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 135.
$7 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
2 J. GiORGI, supra note 67, at 158.
89 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
90 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 132.
91 Id. at 153.




concept of anticipatory breach. In Venezuela, therefore, the promisee of
an obligation to abstain cannot begin an action against the promisor until
the promisor has undertaken the prohibited activity. Yet, by the time the
breach occurs, the specific performance of the obligation has become im-
possible9 4 and the promisee is forced to settle for money damages. This
would be the case, for example, if a theater owner and an opera singer
entered into a contract pursuant to which the promisor would be prohib-
ited from singing at the theater across the street. The impresario could
not sue the promisee for breach of contract until the latter actually had
sung for the competitor's theater. At that point, the promisee could seek
the indirect specific performance of the obligation (not available since the
breaching act was not reversible) or the payment of damages arising from
the promisor's breach. He could not, however, sue to prevent the prom-
isor from singing for the competitor in the future9 5
For purposes of contract remedies, Venezuelan law distinguishes be-
tween obligations to abstain which, if breached, lead to consequences that
the parties or a court can reverse, erase or destroy from those where
breach creates irreversible consequences."' According to the commenta-
tors and the jurisprudence, the former type, but not the latter type obli-
gation, is subject to indirect specific performance. 97 The Civil Code imple-
ments this approach by providing that a court may grant the promisee
authorization to destroy or have a third party destroy, at the promisor's
expense, that which has been done in breach of an obligation to abstain. 8
This distinction raises an ambiguity about when a particular conse-
quence arising from a breach is subject to destruction. Commentators do
not agree as to the scope and definition of the destruction doctrine.9
Similarly, Venezuelan law does not purport to specify the circumstances
under which such consequences are subject to destruction. 100 Obviously,
there are physical limits to the ability to reverse, destroy or erase conse-
quences.20 ' Beyond these practical limitations, destruction could be le-
gally impossible in the following situations: (1) where destruction of the
consequence would trammel on the rights of third parties; and, (2) where
the cost of destruction would be disproportionate to the loss suffered by
the promisee. Unfortunately, Venezuelan commentators discuss the issue
2 J. GIORGI, supra note 67, at 158.
See generally 3 M. ARCAYA, supra note 23, at 195.
96 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
7 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 134; E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 99.
8 CIV. CODE art. 1268.
s Compare E. MADURo LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 97, with Melich-Orsini, supra note
62, at 134; 3 L. BOFF BOGGERO, supra note 65, at 434-36.
100 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 134.
101 For example, a document cannot be recovered once it is burned.
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in general terms without clarifying the analysis in this manner.11 2
It appears that the application of the destruction doctrine in situa-
tions involving third parties depends on the degree of interference with
the third parties interests and rights. It is clear that upon a promisor's
breach of a noncompetition agreement, a promisee can receive judicial
authority to have the promisor's business closed down.103 The degree of
interference with third parties is relatively low in this situation. It is un-
clear, however, how far Venezuelan courts would be willing to go. For ex-
ample, would the court order indirect specific performance if the prom-
isor, instead of establishing his own business, began to work for the
promisee's competitor? Could the court order the competitor to refrain
from hiring the promisor?'" Could the court order the competitor's busi-
ness to turn over to the promisee the profits earned as a result of the
promisor's work? Could the competitor's business be closed down? A for-
eign commentator suggests that this last option would be within the scope
of the doctrine.10 5 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the courts would grant
such a remedy under Venezuelan law. 06
With respect to the second possible limitation on the doctrine of in-
direct specific performance, it is not clear whether a Venezuelan court
would order the destruction of an object where the cost of performance or
the loss to the promisor would be disproportionately high in comparison
with the damage 0 7 suffered by the promisee. Neither the Civil Code108
nor the commentators address this issue. 09 The scarcity of case law on
this point suggests that the courts have not considered the matter.
The promisee will have to settle for money damages if the conse-
quence of the abstention breach is physically or legally irreversible and,
hence, indirect specific performance is rendered impossible.20 As is the
case with obligations to give and obligations to do, there is no clear guid-
ance in this situation as to how courts would measure these money
damages."'
In Venezuela, the promisor may alternatively seek money damages
102 See, e.g., E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 100.
13 3 L. BOFFI BOGGERO, supra note 65, at 434.
104 Clearly not.
105 3 L. BOFF BOGGERO, supra note 65, at 435-36.
108 E. MADURo LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 101. These issues are of particular concern to
foreign entities that enter into sales representation and licensing agreements in Venezuela.
10M See generally A. COLIN & H. CAPITANT, supra note 16, at 40.
'0 Cf. CIv. CODE arts. 1274 and 1275. Article 1274 states that the promisor only will be
liable for damages that are foreseen or should have been foreseen at the time of the con-
tract. Article 1275 limits damages to those that arise immediately and directly from the
breach.
"0' See E. MADURO LUYANDO, supra note 6, at 101.
110 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 134.
"I See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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even if specific performance is available to him. Pursuant to the Civil
Code, he may demand the payment of money damages for the loss suf-
fered solely from the promisor's breach." 2
D. Enforcement of Judgments
The aggrieved promisee seeks not only the affirmation, but, also the
enforcement of his contractual right by a court of law.'" Like most legal
systems, the Venezuelan system does not grant the promisee the unilat-
eral power to enforce a court judgment. Similarly, the Venezuelan system
does not simply leave it up to the promisor to obey judgments at will.
Rather, the Venezuelan Code of Civil Procedure places the responsibility
for enforcing court judgments on courts of first instance." 4
Under general principles of Venezuelan law, judicial procedure must
grant to whomever has a substantive right all that he has a right to ob-
tain."6 Thus, in theory, Venezuelan procedure should not interfere with a
promisee's ability to vindicate his substantive right to specific perform-
ance. In practice, however, this maxim is seldom satisfied with respect to
the enforcement of judgments for specific performance."16 This inade-
quacy results from the application of three principles found in the Vene-
zuelan civil law system. The first two principles are that: (1) all contrac-
tual duties are patrimonial in nature," 7 and, (2) a court cannot compel an
obligor, through the use of physical force, to undertake a physical act in
performance of a contractual duty."8 These rules leave room for courts to
enforce civil judgments against an obligor's property but not against his
person. The third principle-that a civil judgment merely reaffirms the
promisor's obligation toward the promisee, but does not necessarily estab-
lish a new relationship between the promisor and the
court"l9 -- accentuates this limitation. This third rule in effect makes it
impossible for a Venezuelan court to compel direct, personal compliance
with its civil decrees. In short, the Venezuelan system undermines com-
... CIv. CODE art. 1266; see also E. MAmuRo LUYANDo, supra note 6, at 97.
113 J. DUQUE SANcHEz, PROCEDIMIENros ESPECIALES CONTENCIOSOS 71 (1981).
114 CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVIL DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA [CODE CIv. PROC.]
arts. 446-57, reprinted in A. HERNANDEZ-BRET6N, CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO CIVMi VENEZO-
LANO 300-05 (1967).
"' Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 75.
116 2 J. GIORGI, supra note 67, at 216.
11 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
119 This attitude is perhaps derived from the view that the promisor's breach does not
affect his primary obligation to perform and does not transform his duty into a secondary
obligation to pay money damages. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Under this
scheme, the judgment is viewed as a reaffirmation of the primary obligation, rather than as
the basis for a new relationship between the promisor and the court.
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pliance with certain kinds of civil judgments, particularly judgments for
specific performance. Venezuelan procedure fails to provide for personal
sanctions such as the common law concept of contempt of court;120 or for
patrimonial sanctions, such as the French astreinte12 1 or the German sys-
tem of fines. 122 The absence of these mechanisms, which are directed at
coercing obligors into complying with civil judgments, 23 allows promisors
in Venezuela to ignore certain civil judgments without incurring an obli-
gation greater than the existing contractual duty affirmed by the
judgment.
The inability to enforce civil obligations against the promisor's per-
son as well as the absence of patrimonial or personal sanctions aimed at
coercing obedience thus results in an inadequate procedural mechanism
for the enforcement of most specific performance judgments.
1. Enforcement of Judgments in Venezuela
a. Enforcement of Judgments for Specific Performance
A major portion of the Venezuelan Code of Civil Procedure is de-
voted to the enforcement of judgments.124 Pursuant to the Code of Civil
Procedure, the defendant is given three days to comply with a civil judg-
ment. 25 If he has not done so by the fourth day, the court will intervene
and order that the judgment be enforced. 26
If the judgment involves an obligation regarding title to real prop-
erty, the court's decision and order (fallo) will serve as evidence of the
title. In those cases, the plaintiff will acquire title over the property im-
mediately upon proper registration of the judgment.' 27 Additionally, the
court will order that the plaintiff be put in possession of the property
through the use of public force if necessary.12 8 The courts also will enforce
obligations to give and to deliver personal property in this manner."91
A recalcitrant defendant can avoid even this simple form of specific
performance. For example, without sanction, he can hide or destroy the
good which he is to deliver. If he succeeds in making the good unavaila-
12o Goldschmidt, Las Astreintes, las Sanciones por Contempt of Court y Otros Medios
Para Consequir el Complimiento de las Obligaciones de Hacer y de no Hacer, in EsTUDIos
DE DERECHO ComPARADo 253, 267 (1958).
121 Id. at 254; 3 MAZEAUD, supra note 68, at 220-24.
122 Szladits, supra note 1, at 228.
122 2 J. GIORGI, supra note 67, at 214.
124 CODE Civ. PROC. arts. 446-501.
225 Id. at art. 449.
126 Id.
11" Judgment of July 27, 1955, Corte de Casaci6n, Caracas, Gaceta Forense (2S) IX 545.
128 CODE Civ. PRoc. art. 449, § 2.
229 Id.; Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 135.
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ble, he will have to pay the promisee the money value of the good, but he
will not be subjected to any additional sanctions for disobeying the
court. 130 In the end, he will have succeeded in denying the promisee his
right to specific performance.'
b. Enforcement of Judgments for Indirect Specific Performance
One of the chief distinctions which Venezuelan law draws between
indirect specific performance and the payment of money damages is that
the former, unlike the latter, requires "the forceful penetration of the de-
fendant's property in order to realize the substitute activity against the
defendant's will."'1s 2 The enforcement of a judgment for indirect specific
performance can involve domestic intervention with the obligor's prop-
erty. This occurs, for example, where the court authorizes the promisee to
have someone destroy, at the promisor's expense, a wall constructed by
the promisor in violation of an obligation to abstain. The Civil Code pro-
vides that courts can grant the promisee authority to secure such indirect
performance of the obligation. 133 The Code of Civil Procedure provides
the mechanism by which the defendant's property can be attached and
liquidated to pay for the costs of destroying the wall. 3 4 To this extent,
therefore, Venezuelan procedure provides a method for enforcing judg-
ments for indirect specific performance.
The difficulty arises, however, where the promisor attempts to inter-
fere with the execution of the judgment. For example, in the situation
described above, the promisor could resist the enforcement of the judg-
ment by resorting to force to prevent the third party from entering his
property to destroy the wall. The promisor's interference could frustrate
the court's decision, yet the court would find itself unable to subject the
culprit to any civil sanctions beyond requiring him to pay the money
equivalent of the obligation. In short, even with respect to indirect spe-
cific performance, the obligor retains the ability under certain circum-
stances to frustrate enforcement of the judgment.
c. Enforcement of Judgments for Money Damages
The Code of Civil Procedure establishes the mechanism for the en-
forcement of money damages."" The Code authorizes judges of first in-
'30 CODE CIv. PROc. art. 449, § 3. Of course, this route is probably not available where
real property is involved.
131 See CIV. CODE art. 1264.
132 Melich-Orsini, supra note 62, at 130 (English translation).
'3 CiV. CODE art. 1268.
'34 CODE CIV. PROc. art. 450.
235 Id.
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stance to order the attachment of the defendant's property." The value
of the property attached cannot exceed twice the amount of the ver-
dict.1 3 7 The Code does not provide a general preference for personal or
real property, although it does grant immunity from attachment of cer-
tain items of personal property." Once attached,139 the obligor's property
is deposited with a trustee.4 0 The value of the property then is assessed
and a public auction is held.' 4 1 The proceeds from the auction are used to
satisfy the judgment for money damages.
2. Reliance on Article 6 of the Law of Judicial Power and Article
485 of the Penal Code for the Enforcement of Judgments
With the exception of the provisions on attachment of goods, the
Code of Civil Procedure fails to provide a mechanism for enforcing civil
judgments. As a result, the defendant often is permitted to disregard an
order for the direct or indirect performance of a contractual obligation
without being subjected to any sanctions." 2 As stated earlier, the absence
of sanctions may result from the view that a civil judgment reaffirms the
promisor's obligation toward the promisee, but does not necessarily estab-
lish a new relationship between the defendant and the court."3
A strong argument can be made, however, that the Penal Code,"4 in
conjunction with the Partial Reform Law of the Organic Law of Judicial
Power (Law of Judicial Power)," 5 establishes the requisite relationship
between the defendant and the court arising from the judgment. The Law
of Judicial Power authorizes courts to employ "all legal means of coer-
cion" at their disposal in order to enforce their judgments.'" Moreover,
the Penal Code provides a clear sanction where the defendant violates his
obligation to the court." 7 Article 485 of the Code states that:
Whoever disobeys an order issued legally by the competent authority or
fails to observe a rule decreed legally by said authority in the interest of
justice or security or public health will be punished with five to twenty
,s6 This represents the practical application of Civ. CODE arts. 1283 and 1284.
137 CODE CIv. PROc. art. 450.
'18 CIv. CODE art. 1929.
'S' CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 458-61 establish the procedure for attaching the defendant's
property.
14 Id. at arts. 462-68.
141 Id. at arts. 477-95.
142 Of course, the promisor still will have to pay money damages arising from the
breach of the principal obligation.
141 See supra note 119.
144 CODIGO PENAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA [PENAL CODE] art. 485 (1982).
11 Partial Reform Law of the Organic Law of Judicial Power, art. 6 (Oct. 12, 1971).
146 Id.
147 PENAL CODE art. 485.
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(20) days of arrest, or a fine of twenty to one-hundred and fifty
bolivares. 48
Courts certainly are competent authorities and their judgments
clearly are orders issued legally in the interest of justice. Thus, although
on its face article 485 would appear applicable, there is no indication that
Venezuelan lawyers have resorted to this article to obtain the enforce-
ment of civil judgments granted in favor of their clients. It would appear
that they consider the article applicable only to penal obligations. This
may change, however, as the level of litigation increases in Venezuela and
the case law develops further.
E. Use of Penalty Clauses to Obtain Specific Performance
Finally, a promisee may try to employ contract penalty clauses as an
alternative method under Venezuelan law of securing the specific per-
formance of contractual obligations. 149
The Civil Code permits the inclusion of penalty clauses for the pur-
pose of assuring the performance'of contractual obligations. 5 0 Although
such clauses would be of little, if any, value to the promisee if they di-
rectly stated that obligations would be executed in specie in the case of
breach, 51 the provisions could still achieve that goal indirectly, by pro-
viding for a substantial pecuniary penalty for nonperformance.152
Such an approach raises the question of whether Venezuelan courts
would exercise discretion in voiding penalty clauses which stipulate dis-
proportionately high amounts and which thus could lead to economically
irrational outcomes. " ' The Venezuelan Civil Code does not expressly
grant judges this power of avoidance. The Code does not even provide for
contracts to be voided on grounds of unconscionability. It does permit the
judge to diminish the amount of the penalty where there has been partial
performance of the principal obligation.'" A court could apply this clause
broadly to lower a particularly disproportionate penalty. A carefully
drafted contract clause, however; probably could prevent the court from
using article 1260 in this manner. For example, the contract could stipu-
148 Id. (English translation).
149 See generally A. COLMo, DE LAS OBLIGACIONES EN GENEAL 131 (1961).
150 CiV. CODE art. 1257.
151 In principle, and regardless of penalty clauses, in case of breach, all obligations
should be specifically performed as long as it is not legally or physically impossible to do so.
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
182 A. COLMO, supra note 149, at 130-31.
183 For a discussion of possible conflicts between the remedy of specific performance
and economically rational behavior, see A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 15, at
1119-21.
154 CIV. CODE art. 1260.
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late that any delay in performance would amount to a complete breach
and further that the penalty clause would apply upon any delay in
performance.
III. CONCLUSION
In Venezuela, a sharp contrast exists between the general principle
that all obligations should be performed exactly as they are contracted, 155
and the infrequent application of specific performance as a contractual
remedy. This paradox arises in part from the application of three other
general principles of civil law: (1) all contractual duties are patrimonial in
nature; (2) the promisor cannot be compelled, by the use of force, to un-
dertake a physical act in performance of a contractual obligation; and, (3)
civil judgments reaffirm the promisor's obligation towaid the promisee,
but do not necessarily establish a new relationship between the promisor
and the court.
These principles of Venezuelan law prevent courts from enforcing
civil obligations against an obligor's person. They also lead to an absence
of sanction that a court might apply against the promisor's person or
property to coerce him into obeying the court's judgment. These two con-
sequences severely limit the circumstances under which courts will grant
specific performance.
More specifically, Venezuelan courts will grant direct specific per-
formance of obligations to give if the obligor controls the real or personal
property which is in dispute. If necessary, the court will order the attach-
ment of the promisor's property pursuant to the Venezuelan Code of Civil
Procedure.1 56 The courts also will make direct specific performance avail-
able in connection with obligations to do that are consequential to obliga-
tions to give.15 7 In addition, obligations to do will be subject to specific
performance if the duty can be met abstractly and therefore does not re-
quire that the promisor undertake any physical acts. The absence of a
concept similar to the common law injunction precludes the imposition of
specific performance of obligations to abstain.
Courts will order the indirect specific performance of obligations to
give if the promisor does not own the property which he is to transfer and
the promisee can obtain such property from a third party.' 5 In practice,
this usually occurs where the object of the obligation is a fungible good; in
theory, indirect specific performance also applies to unique, non-fungible
"I Id. at art. 1264.
'56 CODE CIV. PROC. art. 449.
157 CIv. CODE art. 1265 (an obligation to conserve and to deliver).




property that the obligee can acquire from third parties. Courts will en-
force through indirect specific performance obligations to do if the obliga-
tion involves a fungible activity that can be performed equally well by the
promisor or by another party. This remedy also is granted in connection
with obligations to abstain if the breach leads to consequences that can
be reversed, erased or destroyed. However, the promisor may frustrate
indirect specific performance of these obligations by interfering with their
performance. Venezuelan civil procedure does not provide a mechanism
for sanctioning a defendant who disobeys a court order in this manner.
Venezuelan courts will enforce all other contractual obligations by or-
dering the payment of money damages. Obligations to give which involve
a unique, nonfungible good that has perished or has been destroyed are
treated in this manner. Duties that involve a fungible good which was
available at the time of the breach but no longer is available due to
shortages or legal prohibition also lead to money damages. Obligations to
give that require the promisor to cooperate in the selection and measure
of the goods are also enforceable only by the payment of money damages.
Similarly, obligations to do that involve acts which are personal in nature
are only subject to money damages. The same is true of those activities
that were to be performed within a certain time period that has already
expired. Finally, only money damages are available in connection with
obligations to abstain where the breach creates irreversible consequences.
The promisee always may request money damages even where specific
performance would be available to him.
The above scheme leaves a Venezuelan court impotent in the face of
a recalcitrant promisor, principally because the court's judgment fails to
create a direct relationship between the promisor and the court. This arti-
cle has argued that this crucial relationship can arise from the application
of article 485 of the Penal Code in conjunction with article 6 of the Law
of Judicial Power. Taken together, these provisions establish a mecha-
nism whereby courts can sanction obligors who ignore the court's civil
judgments. The article also has argued that contractual penalty clauses,
which are permitted under Venezuelan law, provide a second alternative
for a party seeking to assure the availability of specific performance in
case of breach of contract. The question remains open whether Venezue-
lan courts would refuse to enforce disproportionally high penalty clauses,
which could lead to economically irrational outcomes, even in the absence
of express code provisions permitting courts to do so.
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